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feels that this form of gerrymandering meets one of the criteria for a
political question as defined in Baker v. Carr: "a lack of judicially dis49
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it."
Since its 1960 decision in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,50 in which gerrymandering for purposes of racial discrimination was held unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has decided only one case pertinent to
this discussion.
In Wright v. Rockefeller,51 the use of racial factors in establishing
district boundaries in order to assure that a racial minority had
representation was declared not violative of the Constitution. Therefore, it seems logical to assume that the Court would not rule unconstitutional a districting plan in which the "one man - one vote"
principle was applied, and yet, in Wright, the district boundaries were
so drawn (gerrymandered) as to further the representation of a
minority (either urban or rural).
The Wallace case has signalled the arrival of reapportionment in
Kentucky. But it has not necessarily signalled the stifling of the rural
minority voice in local government. The door is still open for local
legislative units to innovate within constitutional limits some method of
redistricting which would promote true representation for both rural
and urban interests. It is submitted that this innovation could best be
carried out by combining the principle of "one man - one vote" with
the technique of gerrymandering as described above.
Joseph H. Terry

REAL PROPERTY-IMPLIED WARRANTY IN SALE OF NEw HOUSE By
VENDoR.-A husband and wife purchased a new house from the
builder-owner. Several months after moving in, the purchasers discovered that water seeped through the basement walls every time it
rained and would not drain out. Suit was brought alleging breach of
an implied warranty. The jury found for the plaintiffs. Held: Affirmed.
In selling a new house, builder was bound by an implied warranty
Professor Jewell states:
There is no ideal standard against which to measure an allegedly gerrymandered districting plan . . . . The factors that have discouraged
judicial attack on partisan gerrymandering in state legislative districts
would seem to be equally applicable to cases of gerrymandering that
occur in local units of government. Id. at 797.
60364 U.S. 339 (1960).
51376 U.S. 52 (1964).
49
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that in its major structural features the house was constructed in a
workmanlike manner with suitable materials. Crawley v. Terhune, 487
S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1969).1
Absent an express contractural guaranty to the contrary, the general
common law rule of caveat emptor has, until the present case, continued with respect to sale of real property in Kentucky.2 It denies
recovery for property found defective after purchase, with one major
exception: a house specially built according to the buyer's specifications. The following is an excellent summation of the principles involved in this exception: 3
It is a general principle of law that any person who holds himself
out as specially qualified to perform work of a particular character
impliedly warrants that the work which he undertakes shall be of
proper workmanship. It is also fundamental in the law of building
contracts that one contracting to build a structure for a particular purpose impliedly warrants that the structure when completed shall be reasonably fit for its intended use. These two principles have led to the rule that in the sale of a house to be constructed or in the process of construction there are implied warranties by the vendor that the house shall be built in a reasonably
efficient and workmanlike manner and that the house when comIThe appeal was based on a separate issue involving another party to the
original action, a real estate broker who helped the builder sell the house to the
plaintiffs. The Court followed a fong line of Kentucky precedents by holding
that the Terhunes could not recover from the real estate broker in an action for
deceit unless they could prove the broker's statement that the basement was dry
was made with knowledge that it was untrue and under circumstances that do
not justify belief in its truth. The plaintiffs lost on this issue. The Crawley case
centered on the question whether there was an implied warranty of fitness for
habitation in the sale of a new home absent any fraud or misrepresentation by
the seller. The following represent some of the precedents on the issue of deceit:
McDonald v. Goodman, 239 S.W.2d 97 (Ky. 1951); Bunch v. Bertram, 219
Ky. 848, 294 S.W. 805 (1927); McGuffin v. Smith, 215 Ky. 606, 286 S.W. 884
(1926); Pickerell & Craig Co. v. Bollinger-Baggage Co., 204 Ky. 314, 264
S.W. 737 (1924).
2"Note, that by the civil law, every man is bound to warrant the thing that
he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there be no express warranty, either in deed or in
law- but the common law bindeth him not, for caveat emptor... " 2 Coke,
Litteton 102(a), c.7, § 145 (1633) as cited in Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales
of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. PEv. 541, 542 n. 5 (1961).
"The doctrine of caveat emptor so far as the title of personal property is concerned is very nearly abolished, but in the law of real estate it is still in
force." 7 S. WMLLSON, CoNraTca's 779 (3d ed. 1963). The development of the
doctrine of implied warranty for personal property is discussed at § 975 of this
treatise. For a comprehensive article on the subject, see Jaeger, Privity of Warranty:
Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DuQ. L. REv. 1 (1963).
3
Florida Ry. v. Smith, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 255 (1874); Allen v. Reichart,
73 Ariz. 91, 234 P.2d 818 (1951); Jose-Belz Co. v. DeWitt, 93 Ind. App. 672,
176 N.E. 864 (1931); Hall v. MacLeod, 191 Va. 665, 62 S.E.2d 42 (1950);
Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950); Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates, Ltd. [1931] 2 K.B. 113.
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pleted shall be reasonably fit for the intended habitation. Although
these are two separate warranties, the courts in allowing recovery
have attached no significance to the distinction.4
The Kentucky courts have followed this reasoning in cases involving construction contracts 5 by granting appropriate relief to the
vendee. The house in Crawley, on the other hand, was purchased
ready-made, so that the case brought on appeal was one of first impression. Yet, in affirming judgment for the buyers, the Kentucky
Court seems to have followed a trend lately apparent in several other
jurisdictions: that of protecting the consumer's interests to a greater
extent than has been customary heretofore. 6 In Caporaletti v. A-F
7
Corporation,
a damage suit for injuries resulting from builder's
negligence, the vendee was granted relief and the builder's plea of
caveat emptor was rejected by the court in these words:
Conditions have radically changed since the origin of the common
law rule. Homes are being constructed on a large scale by persons
engaged in the building business for the purpose of selling them
to individual owners. The ordinary purchaser is not in a position
to discover a latent defect by inspection, no matter how thorough
his scrutiny may be, because usually he lacks suffcient familiarity
with the complexities of building construction and the intricacies
of applicable regulations. He should be able to rely on the skill
of the builder who sells the house to him. Otherwise he would be
at the vendor's mercy. 8
Such argumnts appear persuasive. But is the relaxation of the
strict provisions of caveat emptor defensible also on legal grounds?
4 Note, Right of Purchaserin Sale of Defective Home, 4 W. REs. L. REv.
357, 360 (1953).
5 Creson v. Carmody, 310 Ky. 861, 222 S.W.2d 935 (1949); Helm v. Speith,
298 Ky. 225, 182 S.W.2d 635 (1944); Cassinelli v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, 38
S.W.2d 980 (1931); W. D. Harris & Co. v. Lewis, 235 Ky. 810, 32 S.W.2d 401
(1930); Hauck v. Jordan, 235 Ky. 888, 31 S.W.2d 624 (1930). In Hauck, relief
was granted for a defect in a specially built house patterned after a model home.
The reasoning of the Court was that the latent defect could not be discovered by
viewing the model home.
6 The courts have granted relief to the purchaser of a new house wherein
major defects have been afterwards discovered on three principal theories: (1)
implied warranty of fitness for habitation; (2) imminently dangerous condition
caused by negligence in construction; (3) concealing or failing to disclose the
defect. For a thorough discussion of the development and application of these
theories, see Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
7 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956).
8 Id. at 16. A similar view was expressed by Judge Waesche dissenting in
Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957), aff'd on
other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958). The Levy case involved a
malfunction of a sewer line. The case was dismissed on the grounds that there
was no evidence to show that the contractor was at fault.
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The reasoning usually advanced in favor of retaining caveat emptor
warns against straying from acknowledged precedent,9 especially
since vendees can always protect themselves by having an express
warranty against faulty workmanship written into the deed of sale. 10
Otherwise, the vendor would be burdened, in effect, with unlimited
liability, an alternative inviting legal chaos." But excellent counter2
arguments, which apparently influenced the Court in Crawley,1 were
3
offered in the Idaho case of Bethlahmy v. Bechtel.' "A buyer who has
no knowledge, notice, or warning of defects, is in no position to exact
specific warranties."' 4 Holding that there was an implied warranty of
fitness where the vendee had bought a house the basement of which
was not properly waterproofed, the court dismissed the fear of legal
"chaos" by specifically denying that the implied warranty theory subjects the builder-vendor to endless claims and automatic liability for
all defects.
The implied warranty of fitness does not impose upon the builder
an obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without
defects, and defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would not
warrant rescission. But major defects which render the house unfit
for habitation, and which are not readily remediable, entitle the
buyer to rescission and restitution. The builder-vendor's legitimate
interests are protected by the rule which casts the burden upon
the purchaser to establish the facts which give rise to the implied
warranty of fitness and its breach. 15

The rule of caveat emptor has also been criticized on grounds that
it encourages fly-by-night operators and hurts the honest builder as a
consequence.'" But perhaps the most crucial argument against the
strict application of caveat emptor, is that the contract for the sale of
9 Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925); Steiber v. Palumbo,
219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959); Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415,
131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968).
'0 Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 26 N.J. 380, 139 A.2d 738 (1958).
11Id.
12 487 S.W.2d at 745.
13 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
1aid. at

-,

415 P.2d at 707.

15 Id. at -, 415 P.2d at 711. The court in Waggener v. Midwestern Dev. Inc.,
154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967) concurs in the view that the standard for determining
whether a house is defective is not perfection but only reasonable workmanship.
In Loma Vista Dec. Co. v. Johnson, 177 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 142 Tex. 686, 180 S.W.2d 92 (1944), the court spelled
out what it meant by an implied warranty: "By offering the house for sale as a
new and complete structure appellant impliedly warranted that it was properly
constructed and of good material and specifically that it had a good foundation... ." Id. at 227.
16 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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a new house is not made between parties with equal bargaining
power.17
The unequal bargaining positions of a professional builder and
an inexperienced purchaser cannot be remedied easily. In the civil law
jurisdiction of Louisiana, there is a legislative solution to this problem
known as the Doctrine of ledhibition. 18 In fact, this doctrine is essentially the same as that of implied warranty of fitness. It provides
relief in damages when an article or property is sold and subsequently
found so defective that it is practically useless. The only exception is
when the defect could have been discovered easily upon inspection.19
But even with that limitation, the Doctrine of Redhibition gives the
citizens of Louisiana more protection than is provided by any other
state.2 0 Thus it is not surprising to find some courts urging legislative
action. 21 A recent example was a plea made by the Maryland court in
in the view that certain sales of realty ought to be covered by an implied warranty similar to that for the sale of goods and personal
property, but declined to issue a holding to that effect. Instead, it
urged the legislature to take the initiative.
The Kentucky Court, however, decided not to wait for legislative
action. It acted on its own authority and gave the purchasers of a
defective house relief. The crucial question is, why, in the absence of
1'7 Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). In fact, as has
been noted in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965),
the vendee is forced to depend on the skill of the developer since he has no real
competency to judge for himself. Professor Bearman, has pointed out that all of
a group of Boston architects interviewed agreed that they were hesitant to inspect ready built houses because too many defects can no longer be discovered
once the house is completed. They preferred to supervise an entire construction
job. The cost for a single trip to inspect a completed house was about $75 to $100;
the cost for supervising the entire construction ran between $300 and $1,000. Bearman, supra note 2, at 545. This was in 1961. Obviously, then, the purchaser
must rely on the skill of the builder.
18 LA. Cirv. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1952).
19
Id. at art. 2521.
20
The doctrine applies to all types of sales unless expressly excluded
[Perkins v. Chatry, 58 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 1952)] including sales of realty
[Rodriguez v. Hudson, 79 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 1955)] and sales of readymade houses [Sterbcow v. Peres, 222 La. 850, 64 So. 2d 195 (1953)].
21 The federal government also has taken legislative action in an attempt to
soften the harsh rule of caveat emptor as it applies to purchasers of real property
by requiring a one year "Warranty of Completion With Approved Plans and
Specifications" for homes insured by the Federal Housing Administration or
Veterans Administration. However, the warranty given relates only to plans and
specifications and not to defects in construction per se. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.
3d 383 (1969). In Helm v. Speith, 298 Ky. 225, 182 S.W.2d 635 (1944), contractors were required by Federal Housing Administration specifications to produce a dampproof basement. Although the contractors followed a recognized
method of dampproofing in a skillful manner, the basement still leaked. The
Court held that the contractor could not be held liable for unsatisfactory results.
22 with virtually the same facts as Grawley. The court saw merit
a case
22

Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 243 A.2d 515 (1968).
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express legislative authorization, did the court choose to set aside
caveat emptor and apparently suspend its duty to adhere to precedent?
The question could perhaps be answered in the light of Justice Car23
dozo's penetrating reflections on the nature of judicial responsibility:
But I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent,
though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree
relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by
experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of
justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation
in frank avowal and full abandonment.... Perhaps we should do
so oftener in fields of private law where considerations of social
utility are not so aggressive and insistent. There should be greater
readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be
discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have determined the
conduct of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it
was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained
a new significance or development with the progress of the years. 24
The argument advanced by the Court in Crawley seems to have
followed this kind of reasoning. It did not disregard existing precedents, but built upon and expanded them by arguing that there was
no real difference between a contract by a builder to sell a readymade house and a contract by a builder to construct a house according
to specifications, especially from the buyer's point of view. 25 In either
case, the purchaser should be secure in the knowledge that his new
house is fit for habitation. Indeed, because of its appeal to precedent, the opinion of the Court cannot be easily criticized or disregarded. It lays a strong foundation for future decisions in Kentucky.
Clearly, the trend in Kentucky and in other jurisdictions is away
from strict adherence to the doctrine of caveat emptor and toward
offering more protection to the purchasers of a house from unscrupulous vendors. 26 Perhaps future decisions in the courts will
23 The Court in Crawley relies principally on the decision of Bethlahmy v.
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,--, 415 P.2d 698, 708 (1966) which cites Justice Cardozo's
view.
24 B. C uDozo, THr NATURE oF THE JuDIcL PRocEss 150-51 (1921).
25 437 S.W.2d at 745.
26

But the question of how damages will be computed is still not clear in
Kentucky. The amount of damages was set at $6,000, but the opinion doesn't say
what the $6,000 was for. The following cases represent some of the existing
views on the subject. In De Armas v. Gray, 10 La. Rep. 575 (1837), a presumption of bad workmanship was sufficient to entitle the purchaser to the cost
of repairs. In Bozeman v. McDonald, 40 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1949), the
cracking of walls of a house within a year after its completion created a presumption of use of poor material or bad workmanship, entitling buyer to dirmunition of the purchase price. In Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830,
329 P.2d 474 (1958), the measure of damages was held to be the difference in
value between the house in its uninhabitable condition and its value had it
been properly constructed.
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encourage the public to demand, and the building industry to supply,
better quality construction.
Rosalie P. van Nuis

